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The continuous increase in the real estate price has been an extremely popular topic 
over the past few years. Since 2003, the central government has carried out a series of 
regulation policies to stabilize the price, yet the outcome of which has not been very 
satisfying. The disappointment correlates closely with the local government’s defying 
behaviors towards the macro adjustments and controls. However, what is the 
motivation of the local government and how does the local government influence the 
central government’s decision remain obscure. Further in-depth investigations become 
extremely crucial in the secure continuation of the macro adjustments and controls. 
In this study, I used current situations-cause-counter strategy as the main stream, 
correlated the results from the central government’s regulation on real estate price, 
and analyzed local government’s actions as well as its influential roles in the central 
government’s adjustments and controls from multiple angles. Furthermore, I proposed 
relevant strategies to facilitate the macro adjustments and controls achieving its 
anticipated results. The study is divided into four chapters. 
 Chapter 1. I addressed the background and significance of this study and 
summarized the ongoing domestic and international research. At the same time, I 
outlined the structure and the organization of this study. 
Chapter 2. I reiterated the policy and preliminary outcomes of the central regulation 
on the real estate market and analyzed the local government’s benefits behind the 
over-priced market, as well as its actions towards the macro adjustments and controls. 
Chapter 3. I first assessed the institutional environment that the local government is 
encountering, then analyzed the influence of the local government on the macro 
adjustments and controls from different perspectives, including, principal-agent theory, 
game theory, rent seeking theory. I’ve pointed out that the current imperfect institution 
has caused the distorted behaviors of the local government. In such institution, the 
central government, as a principal, reinforces and controls the local government 















very likely have misled the local government to the wrong direction. Underneath the 
decentralized institution, the local government has gradually revealed its 
interests-driven motivation and initiates the competition with the central government 
over profits by means of defying against the central adjustments and controls.  
Moreover, during the government-led innovation, many local government officials 
have obtained more rent seeking opportunities that are completely based on and 
driven by personal benefits, which also deteriorates the execution of the central 
adjustment policy. 
Chapter 4. Based on the analysis stated above, I proposed strategies against the 
defying actions from the local government: use law enforcements to regulate and 
alleviate the uncoordinated relationship between the central and local government, 
exercise proper incitement and administration to reinforce the regulation on the local 
government, in parallel with refining the macro adjustment and control system. 
 
 
Key Words: Real Estate Market; Behavior of Local Government; Macro Adjustments 














目   录 
 
第一章 导言 ……………………………………………………………1 
第一节 选题背景及意义 …………………………………………………1 
第二节 国内外研究现状 ……………………………………………………2 
第三节 研究方法及结构安排 ………………………………………………4 
第二章 房价调控与地方政府行为……………………………………7 
第一节 中央政府的房地产调控政策及其实施效果………………………7 
第二节 高房价背后的地方政府利益与中央政府损失 …………………8 
第三节 利益驱动下的地方政府行为 ……………………………………1 
第三章 对地方政府行为的分析 ……………………………………15 
第一节 我国地方政府面临的制度环境 ………………………………15 
第二节 委托代理关系与地方政府行为 ………………………………21 
第三节 利益博弈与地方政府行为 ……………………………………23 
第四节 地方政府的寻租活动 …………………………………………29 
第四章  地方政府行为的规范与中央宏观调控的完善……………33 
第一节 规范中央政府与地方政府的关系 ………………………………33 
第二节 对地方政府行为的激励与约束 …………………………………36 
































 1．1 Background and Significance………………………………………1 
 1．2 The Status Quo of Research………………………………………2 
 1．3 Methods and Structure………………………………………………4 
Chapter2 ADJUSTMENTS AND CONTROLS ON REAL ESTATE MARKET 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S BEHAVIOR………………………………7 
 2．1 Adjustments and Controls on Real Estate Market and the Effect of 
Implementation………………………………………………………………7 
 2．2 The Benefits of Local Government and the Losses of Central 
Government behind the High House Prices………………………………8 
 2．3 Behavior of Local Government driven by its interests……………11 
Chapter3 ANALYSIS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S BEHAVIOR………15 
 3．1 Institutional Environment Faced by Local Government…………15 
 3．2 Principal-Agent and Local Government’s Behavior………………21 
 3．3 Interests Games and Local Government’s Behavior………………23 
 3．4 Rent Seeking Activities of Local Government……………………29 
Chapter4 REGULATIONS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT’S BEHAVIOR AND 
IMPROVEMENTS OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S ADJUSTMENT AND 
CONTROL SYSTEM ……………………………………………………33 
 4．1 Regulations of Local and Central Governments’ relationship………33 
 4．2 Incitement and Constraints on Local Government’s Behavior………36 




























第一章  导言 
 1
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